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Abstract: 
Mobile instant messaging services (MIMS) are emerging as important digital environments 
in citizens’ everyday lives. We explore the use of MIMS for talking about politics with 
unique survey data on samples representative of internet users in Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom. First, we show that robust percentages of our respondents who use MIMS 
employ them for posting political messages and discussing politics. Secondly, we 
demonstrate that political talk on MIMS is positively associated with users’ tendency to 
censor themselves politically on social networking sites (SNS) and, to a lesser extent, with 
ideological extremism. Thirdly, we find that the association between self-censorship on SNS 
and the likelihood of publishing political contents on MIMS is stronger for individuals living 
in former East Germany where, due to historical reasons, large segments of the population 
are reluctant to talk about politics in public. Our findings suggest that MIMS make a 
distinctive contribution to contemporary repertoires of political talk, with important 
implications for the quality and inclusiveness of interpersonal political discussion. 
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Introduction 
 
Mobile instant messaging services (MIMS) such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and 
Snapchat1 are applications that allow individuals and groups to exchange text and 
multimedia messages via their mobile devices. These platforms are challenging, and in 
some countries surpassing, social networking sites (SNS) as the most adopted digital 
means for social connection. WhatsApp, the most popular of these services globally, was 
reported to have a billion users worldwide in February 2016, being outnumbered only 
by Facebook.2  
MIMS are mobile native applications, developed and conceived for smartphones. 
Therefore, their adoption is connected to the evolution of mobile communication 
devices and the use of the internet in mobility. This is important because, as argued by 
Campbell (2013), “mobility matters” in shaping the social implications of 
communication technologies. By enabling information flows that are unbounded from 
physical barriers while intertwined with users’ daily routines, mobile communication 
disrupts “users’ connection to spaces and co-present others, while also serving as a new 
way to interface with locations as hubs of social activity” (Campbell 2013, p. 11).  
Research has addressed how these features of mobile communication can impact 
political information and participation (Neumayer & Stald, 2014) and the profiles of 
citizens engaged in such activities (Martin, 2015). However, scholars have by and large 
overlooked the differences between the various technologies through which individuals 
                                                      
1 Snapchat is technically a MIMS since it allows users to share videos and chat with their contacts via 
mobile devices. However, it can be argued that some of its affordances make it similar to a social 
networking platform: “Stories” can be publicly shared and the “Discover” section contains “dedicated 
channels” curated by major publishers and news organizations. However, even fragments of public stories 
can be commented only privately and nobody is allowed to know who is connected to a user. These 
features make the service closer to MIMS than to SNS, at least for the purposes of the present study.  
2 See http://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbi-whatsapp-just-switched-encryption-billion-
people/ (accessed 18 May 2016). 
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can engage with mobile political communication, and the different affordances these 
technologies entail. Text-messaging, emails, web browsing, mobile applications of news 
organizations, SNS, and MIMS all enable users to access and share political information 
on the move, but do so in markedly different ways, appealing to different types of users. 
Therefore, the impact of MIMS on political discussion should be assessed not only as 
part of the broader phenomenon of mobile communication, but in light of the specific 
features of these platforms. Importantly for political talk, MIMS enable conversations in 
relatively more intimate, closed, and controlled environments than SNS. 
We shed light on the role of MIMS in contemporary citizens’ political talk by 
presenting unique online survey data based on samples representative of internet users 
in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The data show that robust percentages of 
our respondents who use MIMS employ them for publishing political messages and 
discussing political matters. Multivariate analyses demonstrate that users who tend to 
censor their own political opinions on social media and those holding extreme 
ideological positions are more likely to engage in political talk on MIMS. Our 
comparative design then helps us uncover that the association between self-censorship 
on SNS and posting political messages on MIMS is stronger for individuals living in 
former German Democratic Republic (East Germany) than former Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany). In East Germany, the communist regime which was in power 
before the 1989 reunification established a highly pervasive surveillance system—the 
infamous State Security Service (STASI). One of its lasting legacies is widespread 
discomfort with political expression within public environments among former East 
German residents—which helps explain why, even to this day, those of them who are 
less than confident in expressing their views in relatively public social media are more 
comfortable speaking out on MIMS.  
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Taken together, our findings suggest that MIMS play a distinctive role in 
contemporary ecosystems enabling political talk. MIMS appeal to citizens who especially 
value the intimate nature of these services, whether because of their self-consciousness 
in expressing some of their political views on more open digital spaces or because they 
hold more extreme political views. Our comparative analysis shows that these patterns 
can be reinforced by political culture. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
The Craft of the Networked Self between Open and Closed Digital Spaces 
 
Rainie and Wellman (2012) argued that “networked individualists”—i.e., individuals 
connected with others through multiple and diverse networks—should be considered 
the key actors of contemporary “social operating systems”. On the one hand, digital 
platforms complicate strategies of self-presentation because they frequently “combine a 
variety of audiences, of variable privacy and publicity into a single crowd of spectators 
observing the same performance” (Papacharissi, 2011, p. 307). On the other hand, 
networked individualists can take advantage of this conflation by establishing multiple 
connections well beyond the “little boxes” (Wellman, 2002)—the smaller and more 
clearly defined groups where most social life was previously performed. However, they 
must also carefully manage their “networked self” to simultaneously cope with the 
expectations of the multiple audiences they can reach via digital networks (Papacharissi, 
2011). 
Individuals connecting with one another in online environments coalesce in 
“networked publics”, which boyd (2011, p. 49) defines as characterized by three 
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features: invisible audiences, as members do not have extensive information on who may 
be exposed to their communication; collapsed contexts, as digital networks often 
traverse established social boundaries; and the blurring of public and private dimensions 
of the self. These phenomena have relevant implications for political talk (Papacharissi, 
2015). Citizens who talk about politics in digital environments interact with audiences 
and in situations that may be more difficult to define, understand, and control than in 
face to face settings. 
The diffusion of mobile technology has been credited as one of the factors 
contributing to the development of networked individualism (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). 
However, the specific affordances of different types of platforms used through mobile 
devices could have different implications for how networked individuals engage in 
political talk while on the go. The concept of “intermediality”, or the simultaneous 
availability of different modes of communication (Helles, 2013), is relevant here. Mobile 
devices such as smartphones and tablets enable users to craft their own experiences by 
mixing various applications according to their needs, interests, and goals (Goggin, 2009). 
Therefore, in studying political talk on MIMS, we must start by analyzing the 
peculiarities of these services vis a vis SNS as well as traditional short text messages. 
First, MIMS are mobile native and are accessible exclusively—or nearly so3—via 
mobile devices. By contrast, mobile users access SNS via Apps that are mobile versions 
of the services available via desktop and laptop computers. Some studies have 
addressed how users assess the differences between MIMS and other mobile channels 
for social connectivity. Church and De Oliveira (2013) showed that users perceive 
                                                      
3 Some services can also be accessed via desktop or laptop computers, but only through relatively 
cumbersome procedures, i.e. employing emulators of mobile operating systems or—only for WhatsApp—
syncing a mobile device with a computer. Facebook Messenger is an exception, since it is by default 
synced with the private messaging function of Facebook, but the user interfaces for the mobile and 
computer versions differ substantially. 
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WhatsApp as more immediate and conversational, and thus conducive to more natural 
social interactions, than traditional short text messages. O’Hara, Massimi, Harper, 
Rubens, and Morris (2014) revealed that users favor WhatsApp to maintain intimate 
relationships with people they consider emotionally close and are, often, geographically 
proximate. They argued that discussion threads on WhatsApp “were viewed by 
participants as something that would be picked up again whenever and wherever. Just 
as the friendship is never ending, so the thread of encounters is in WhatsApp” (p. 6). 
Finally, Utz, Muscanell, and Khalid found that users took advantage of the “private 
nature” of Snapchat to build smaller and tighter networks than on Facebook, valuing 
Snapchat as an alternative to the public and one-to-many setting of communication  
characterizing most SNS (2015, p. 144; see also Vaterlaus, Barnett, Roche, & Young, 
2016). 
This is not to suggest that users connect exclusively with strangers on social 
networking websites, and exclusively with close acquaintances on MIMS. To the 
contrary, maintaining relations with family, friends, acquaintances and offline contacts 
in general represents a highly relevant function of social media (Ellison, Steinfield, & 
Lampe, 2007). However, the affordances of most SNS favor the integration of strong and 
week ties (Ellison et al., 2011) and users of these platforms are encouraged by their 
affordances to broadcast their messages to their whole, relatively broad networks, as 
well as being exposed to broadcasts from others they are connected to. The degree to 
which users experience a platform as a public or private space also results from the 
interplay between its affordances and the communities inhabiting it. The massive 
diffusion of Facebook, which makes it a highly crowded space, encourages users to 
experience it as a public or semi-public environment (boyd 2014, pp. 204-205). 
Therefore, the collapse of contexts and the consequent necessity of performing the self 
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in front of multiple, and partially invisible, audiences are particularly intense on SNS, 
especially the most popular ones (Marwick & boyd, 2011).  
 By contrast, MIMS users interact with individual contacts or clearly defined 
groups and can check whether their messages have been seen and by whom thanks to 
read receipts. On some MIMS, such as Snapchat, users can even limit the time their 
message is visible for its addressees (Clark 2016, p. 238). While MIMS retain some 
relevant digital features that contributed to the development of networked 
individualism—such as the emergence of different “social clusters” crafted around 
individuals (Song, 2010, p. 267)—they also enable users to recreate Wellman’s (2002) 
“little boxes”, where people engage with small groups and individual users. In boyd’s 
(2011) terminology, context collapse is less likely to occur on MIMS than on SNS, 
audiences on MIMS are less invisible to users than those on SNS, and the prevalent mode 
of communication on MIMS is more likely to tilt towards the private than the public 
when compared to SNS. 
In this paper, we assess how these properties of MIMS may enable different 
forms of political talk. We theorize that certain types of individuals are particularly 
likely to turn to MIMS for political talk because they provide more intimate, closed, and 
controlled environments than the more open and public SNS. We argue that the 
affordances highlighted above should make MIMS particularly appealing for individuals 
who are reluctant to express themselves politically in more public digital spaces, and for 
individuals whose political ideology is relatively extreme—and thus more likely to elicit 
opposition if voiced in open environments and broader networks. 
 
Political Self-Censorship, Extremism, and Political Talk on MIMS 
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According to the Uses and Gratification theory (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973), 
individuals choose and exploit the specific features of different media to gratify 
particular needs and goals. Originally developed for the mass media, this theory has 
been employed more recently to explain different uses of digital media (e.g. Cho, Gil De 
Zúñiga, Rojas, & Shah, 2003; Quan-Haase & Young, 2010).  
Most citizens are reluctant to talk about politics in public settings (Schudson, 
1997; Eliasoph, 1998), especially when discussion revolves around divisive issues or 
when they fear most participants disagree with them (Noelle-Neumann 1974). For the 
reasons highlighted above, social networking sites only partially shelter reluctant 
political talkers from these concerns. Those individuals may be more at ease talking 
about politics in spaces that are more private, closed and intimate—such as those 
enabled by MIMS. Although social media users tend to cluster and select content 
according to their political preferences (Gaines & Mondak, 2009; Bakshy et al. 2015), 
experience of political disagreement on SNS is not uncommon (Vaccari et al., 2016), 
potentially making political talk on social media an uncomfortable experience. This 
could be especially true for people who are particularly concerned that expressing their 
views on controversial issues in the broadcast mode encouraged by SNS may damage 
their relationships with some members of their wide networks. Rather than face those 
risks, these people could then decide to withhold their political opinions, as occurs in 
face-to-face settings (Hayes, Glynn, & Shanahan, 2005). Das and Kramer (2013) 
observed the behavior of 3.9 million Facebook users for 17 days and concluded that 
“last-minute self-censorship” (i.e. eventually deciding not to publish a post or comment 
after having typed it) is quite common: 71% of monitored users censored at least one of 
their posts or comments (on any topic) in this way. Sleeper et al. (2013) found that one 
of the main motivations why Facebook users censor themselves was that they fear their 
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posts may reach beyond their intended audiences. Although Facebook enables users to 
determine which subgroups within their networks can see their posts, participants 
found those features “confusing or difficult to use” (p. 8), resorting to self-censorship as 
a safer option instead. 
Based on the Uses and Gratifications theory and the empirical evidence on self-
censorship on social media, we expect that users who censor themselves politically on 
SNS should be more likely to use MIMS for political talk, as they may feel more at ease in 
expressing and exchanging political views within the tighter networks and private 
environments that characterize these platforms. We thus hypothesize that individuals’ 
propensity towards political self-censorship on Social Networking Sites is positively 
associated with their likelihood to employ Mobile Instant Messaging Services for political 
talk (H1). 
Using MIMS for political talk could also be gratifying for citizens holding 
relatively extreme ideological positions. Ideologically extreme views appeal to 
minorities of the population and are frequently stigmatized in democracies, especially 
those characterized by problematic authoritarian legacies and centripetal party 
competition. Extremists are therefore less likely to openly express their views in public 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1984). These elements might lead citizens who place themselves at 
the extremes of the ideological spectrum to prefer intimate and closed environments for 
political talk. Accordingly, research suggests that political extremists use the internet 
not to communicate with the general population, but to create networks of websites, 
blogs, forums and bulletin boards where they can establish more intimate connections 
with likeminded people, thus generating alternative spheres for political talk (e.g. Caiani 
& Wagemann, 2009; Wojcieszak, 2010).  
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Individuals holding extreme political views may therefore see MIMS as a 
particularly comfortable environment for political talk. The high level of network 
selection and message control allowed by these platforms facilitates the circulation of 
controversial information and opinions within closed circles, where individuals face 
lower risks of incurring sanctions from opponents. Moreover, extreme views can be 
banned on other digital arenas: for instance, Facebook can remove content and close 
pages that host hate speech.4 We therefore hypothesize that individuals with relatively 
more extreme ideologies are more likely to employ Mobile Instant Messaging Services for 
political talk (H2). 
 
Political Self-Censorship in Context 
 
In reassessing the “Spiral of Silence” theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), Scheufele and Moy 
(2000) argued that scholars wishing to understand how individuals decide to express or 
withhold their opinions in public in the face of widespread dissent should pay more 
attention to the role of cultural characteristics. We build on this insight and leverage our 
comparative research design to explore how the legacy of intrusive government 
surveillance impacts present-day citizens’ political culture, and in particular their 
confidence to talk about politics in public and private digital spaces (MacKinnon, 2011).  
 To assess the role of these aspects of political culture, we compare three 
established European democracies: Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, focusing in 
particular on differences between former East and West Germany. Historically, East 
Germany was characterized by a highly pervasive state surveillance, established by the 
                                                      
4 See https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards (accessed 8 December 2016) 
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communist regime that ruled the country (1949-1990) before Germany was reunified. 
State surveillance in East Germany strictly monitored all aspects of citizens’ social lives 
based on extensive networks of informants. Authorities routinely demanded the 
population report “suspect” fellow citizens (Betts, 2010). This context fostered a culture 
of deeply ingrained distrust and suspicion for others, eroding social capital and 
impacting several aspects of public life (Jacob & Tyrell, 2010). 
Such traumatic heritage is likely to have lasting impacts on the political culture of 
citizens who experienced it and on their first offspring, and in turn may affect their 
approach to political talk in different online platforms. The legacy of state surveillance 
may discourage some East Germans from exchanging political views on relatively more 
open digital platforms, while increasing the appeal, among those politically self-
conscious users, of more closed online environments. To test this theory, we need to 
ensure that the relationships of interest are not confounded by other systemic factors 
that differ across the countries included in our study. Therefore, we compare citizens of 
the former East and West Germany, as the latter, while living today in the same country 
as the former, did not experience a similar surveillance regime in the recent past, and 
their offspring’s political socialization was not affected by memories of such invasive 
state monitoring. We thus hypothesize that the association between individuals’ tendency 
towards political self-censorship on SNS and their likelihood to employ MIMS for political 
talk is stronger for citizens living in the former East Germany than for those living in the 
former West Germany (H3).  
Besides Germany, this study also covers Italy and the United Kingdom. Albeit 
similar in many ways, such as being large and relatively affluent European democracies, 
these countries differ from one another in various important aspects. The diffusion of 
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digital platforms is of relevance here. According to commercial data from January 20165, 
SNS are used by 59% of British citizens, 47% of Italians, and 36% of Germans. When it 
comes to MIMS, in Germany WhatsApp—the most popular MIMS there—has overtaken 
Facebook in term of users (39% vs. 38% among internet users) and in Italy it is close to 
the same landmark (33% for Facebook vs. 30% for WhatsApp), while in the UK 
Facebook is still firmly leading (47% vs. 24%).6 It is also worth noting that, while no 
national elections were held in Germany and Italy in 2015—the year when we collected 
our data—a general election had been held in the UK six months before our surveys 
were fielded. These differences, which will be taken into account in analyzing our 
findings, will enable us to establish more robust generalizations than if we had studied a 
single country. 
 




We test our theories with custom-built Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) 
surveys conducted in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Surveys were 
administered by IPSOS and responses were collected between November 10-December 
1, 2015. For each country, a sample (N = 1,750) of Internet users aged 18–74 years was 
constructed with quota sampling to ensure that the survey population would be 
representative of the adult population with internet access in each country. The 
variables included in the quota sampling were age, gender, region of residence (based 
                                                      
5 See http://wearesocial.com/special-reports/digital-in-2016 (accessed 22 May 2016). 
6 See Note 5. 
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on NUTS27 classification), occupational condition, and educational level. Respondents 
were recruited from online panels and were offered non-monetary incentives to 
participate. Participation rates were 20.2% for Germany, 20.5% for Italy, and 19.1% for 
the United Kingdom.8 
 
Variables and Models 
 
Our hypotheses focus on the factors predicting the likelihood of using MIMS for political 
talk. We operationalize two different dimensions of political talk: one-way talk, i.e. 
sharing political messages, and two-way talk, i.e. discussing political issues with others. 
This distinction enables us to account for different behaviors that, while overlapping to 
some extent, do not necessarily coexist all the time. The questions measuring these 
dependent variables were included in a battery introduced as follows: “Over the past 6 
months, when using these instant messaging services [previously specified as 
‘WhatsApp, Facebook messenger, Viber, WeChat, Snapchat, and the like’], have you...?” 
The two items were: “sent messages about politics or public affairs” and “discussed 
politics or public affairs”. Response modes were “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t know” (treated 
as missing value). These questions were asked only to respondents who previously 
reported using MIMS. 
                                                      
7 NUTS stands for “Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics” and is a geographical classification that 
subdivides territories of the European Union into regions at three different levels. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview (accessed June 2016). 
8 9,021 invitations were sent in Germany, 9,000 in Italy, and 9,500 in the United Kingdom. In Germany, 
6,660 recipients did not open the survey link, 247 abandoned the interview and 364 were screened out or 
turned out to be over quota. In Italy, 6,493 recipients did not open the survey link, 304 abandoned the 
interview and 453 were screened out or turned out to be over quota. In the United Kingdom, 7,163 
recipients did not open the survey link, 260 abandoned the interview and 327 were screened out or 
turned out to be over quota. 
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Our independent variables measure political self-censorship on SNS (H1 and H3) 
and ideological extremism (H2). 
We measure political-self censorship on SNS trough the question: “In managing 
the personal relationships on social networks / social media platforms (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube etc.) in which you discussed politics with someone, during the last 6 
months have you … not published political content for fear of offending someone, or 
compromising yourself too much?”. Response modes were “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t 
remember” (treated as missing value). 21% of German, 22.8% of British and 26.5% of 
Italian respondents who used social media reported censoring themselves in this way.  
 To measure ideological extremeness, we employ answers to the question: “Many 
people use the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ when talking about politics. Where do you place 
yourself on this scale?” Respondents were asked to locate themselves on a 7-point scale. 
The first point on the left was labeled as “Left” (chosen by 6.6% of German, 4.3% of 
British and 8.1% of Italian respondents) and the last point on the right as “Right” 
(chosen by 2.2% of German, 5.7% of British and 11.8% of Italian respondents). Answers 
were recoded into a variable measuring level of political extremism, ranging from 0 
(respondents describing themselves as centrist or answering that they did not identify 
themselves with these terms) to 3 (respondents who chose one of the two extreme 
points in the scale). 
 We conducted all analyses on a pooled dataset to better assess the significance of 
differences in the strength of the relationships between variables in different countries. 
To test H3, we clustered British and Italian respondents by country, while creating two 
separate clusters for those residing in regions of the former East and West Germany.9 
                                                      
9 We classified respondents residing in Berlin as residents in former East Germany. Given the peculiar 
history of Berlin, we also ran our models excluding Berlin residents and the results were consistent with 
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We then created an interaction term between political self-censorship on SNS and 
residence in East Germany, with residence in West Germany as the reference category. 
Since our dependent variables are dichotomous, we employ logistic regressions 
to test our hypotheses. Our models control for gender, age, education, income, political 
efficacy, interest in politics, exposure to political news through different channels 
(television, printed newspapers, radio, and internet websites), and frequency of political 
discussion offline and on SNS. We also control for frequency of access to the internet via 
smartphones, use of smartphones to produce multimedia content, and membership in 
groups on MIMS. Intensive and competent uses of mobile devices, as well as the kinds of 
networks tapped via these tools, can affect the relationship between mobile 
communication and political engagement (Campbell & Kwak, 2010). 
It should be noted that our SNS-related questions were asked only to 
respondents who reported having a profile on at least one platform (84.8% of German, 
87.9% of British, and 95.5% of Italian respondents), while those related to MIMS were 
asked only to users of those services. Consequently, our findings only apply to 
respondents who use both SNS and MIMS. Supplementary analyses established that this 
choice did not introduce any substantial biases due to individuals’ selecting themselves 
into using SNS, MIMS, or both.10  
                                                                                                                                                                      
those discussed in this article. (Data available upon request.) It might be argued that the internal 
migration that occurred in reunified Germany since 1989 makes it problematic to employ respondents’ 
current region of residence to test our hypothesis. However, most of this migration ran from East to West 
and occurred in the two years after reunification (Hunt, 2006). Therefore, our sample likely includes more 
West German residents formerly living in East Germany than East German residents formerly living in 
West Germany. To the extent that such distortion exists, it should bias our findings against rather than in 
favor of H3. 
10 We ran the same analyses with data including all respondents, as well as all respondents who used 
MIMS regardless of whether they used social media. In these models, we recoded as “0” those respondents 
who were not asked a question about political uses of SNS or MIMS because they had not reported using 
either or both platforms. The models based on all respondents using MIMS, irrespective of whether they 
used SNS or not, yielded substantively identical findings to those reported here for all three hypotheses. 
The models based on all respondents, irrespective of whether or not they used both MIMS and SNS, 
yielded substantive identical findings for H1 and H3. With respect to H2, the coefficients for ideological 
 




Descriptive statistics on MIMS’ general and political use offer some interesting insights 
into the importance of these platforms for political talk. 61.9% of German respondents 
use MIMS, 22.1% of those German MIMS users post political content, and 25% discuss 
politics on these services; 55.4% of British respondents are active on MIMS, 38.1% of 
them publish political messages, and 33.5% talk about politics there; finally, 83.3% of 
Italians employ MIMS, 28.4% of them send politics-related posts, and 27.8% engage in 
political conversations therein. These statistics show that, although the diffusion of 
MIMS varies substantially across the three countries, political talk is more evenly 
distributed, especially in its two-way dimension. Moreover, MIMS users are more likely 
to engage in both one-sided and two-sided political talk in the UK, where these services 
are relatively less popular, than in Germany and Italy, where they are more popular. The 
fact that the United Kingdom is the only country among those considered here where a 
national election was held in 2015 might contribute to explaining this pattern. Although 
we did not ask respondents to recall behaviors that occurred during the campaign,11 
British respondents may still have been influenced by the relatively recent experience of 
the campaign in reporting their political activities on MIMS. An alternative explanation 
may be that, since MIMS are less widely used in the UK than Germany and Italy, British 
users may exhibit some of the typical features of early adopters, and may thus use these 
platforms more actively. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
extremism were in the same direction and had similar strengths as those reported here, but fell slightly 
below the conventional significance thresholds (B=.092, p=.074) when posting political messages on 
MIMS is the dependent variable. (Data available upon request.) 
11 Our questions referred to the six months preceding the interview, while the British general election was 
held more than six months before our surveys were in the field. 
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Interesting patterns emerge when we compare the diffusion of political talk on 
MIMS and SNS. Among respondents who talk about politics on MIMS and are also SNS 
users, 51.1% of Germans, 51% of British and 42.7% of Italians reported sending political 
messages on MIMS but not publishing political content on social media.12 Similarly, 
29.4% of Germans, 32.9% of British, and 33.8% of Italians who discussed politics on 
MIMS did not do so on social media even though they are users of those platforms. These 
data show that political talk on MIMS and SNS overlap to some extent, but quite a few 
respondents (one in two in Germany and the UK when it comes to political posting, one 
in three in Italy with respect to discussing politics) who use both platforms talk about 
politics on MIMS but not on SNS. These findings suggest that MIMS play a specific role 
vis-à-vis SNS as channels for online political talk.  
We now address our hypotheses, which we tested through logistic regressions 
(Table 1 and Table 2) predicting whether respondents report posting political messages 




The coefficients for self-censorship on SNS are positive and significant in both 
models, supporting the hypothesis that political self-censorship on social networking 
sites is positively associated with employing MIMS for political talk (H1). Even after 
controlling for all the other variables in the model—including, crucially, frequency of 
political talk in both SNS and face-to-face contexts—respondents who censor 
                                                      
12 Our battery on political activities on SNS did not feature a question identical to the one measuring 
political posting on MIMS. Here, we refer to answers to the item “…published political news or comments” 
(on SNS). This comparison is acceptable since political news and comments are indeed messages about 
politics and public affairs. 
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themselves politically on social media are more likely to publish political messages and 
to engage in political discussions on MIMS. This finding suggests that MIMS are a viable 
arena for political talk among people who are not completely confident in expressing all 
their opinions on SNS. If we construct a hypothetical respondent for whom all variables 
have values equal to the mean in our sample (calculated based on respondents included 
in the multivariate analysis), the probability that this hypothetical respondent discuss 
politics on MIMS is predicted to jump from 22% if she did not censor her political views 
on SNS to 34% if she did. 
Table 1 also provides partial support for our hypothesis that ideological 
extremism is positively associated with the use of MIMS for political talk (H2). The 
coefficient of the variable measuring extremism is positive in both models, and 
significant in the model predicting the likelihood of posting political messages on MIMS. 
While a hypothetical average respondent who describes herself as centrist (or refuses to 
locate herself in the left-right scale) has a 23% probability of publishing political 
messages on MIMS, that probability grows to 30% for a similar respondent who places 
herself at one of the extremes of the scale. However, we did not find any significant 
association between ideological extremism and political discussion on MIMS, so H2 is 
supported only with respect to one-way political talk. 
Table 1 also reveals different types of inequalities driving political talk on MIMS. 
There are positive and significant associations between both one-way and two-way 
political talk on MIMS and political discussion occurring both offline and on SNS. This 
suggests that habitual political talkers use MIMS to supplement rather than replace their 
conversations in other digital and physical spaces. Mobile-only applications can offer 
frequent political talkers new opportunities to gratify specific needs—for instance, 
posting political messages while on the move or talking about politics within closed 
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groups of “political junkies”. They also support a “rich get richer” vision of digital 
politics, consistent with the fact that political efficacy and access to political information 
are positively and significantly associated with both posting and discussing politics on 
MIMS. Furthermore, the positive and significant association between creative use of 
smartphones and both one-way and two-way political talk highlights the “democratic 
divide” resulting from inequalities in digital skills (Min, 2010).  
Other findings, however, suggest that political talk on MIMS is not solely the 
purview of politically active citizens (Martin, 2015). Age and education are negatively 
associated with both one-way (only the former significantly) and two-way (both 
significantly) political talk on MIMS, and the coefficients for interest in politics, while 
positive, are not significant. Importantly, both one-way and two-way political talk on 
MIMS were positively and significantly associated with membership in groups on these 
platforms. This indicates that MIMS’ potential to promote political talk may depend in 
part on how their affordances enable users to build and engage with different networks, 
aside from one-on-one interactions. These groups may often be non-political in scope, 
but may result in occasional, even accidental, political exchanges that reach beyond the 
types of citizens who normally discuss politics. 
We now assess how context shapes political talk on MIMS. We hypothesized that 
the association between political self-censorship on SNS and the likelihood of employing 
MIMS for political talk is stronger among residents in former East than West Germany 
(H3). We test this hypothesis by adding to our initial models an interaction term 
between self-censorship on SNS and the variables clustering our respondents residing in 
the UK, Italy, and former East Germany, with residents in West Germany serving as 
reference category. 
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[Table 2] 
 
The results in Table 2 provide some support to H3, as the coefficient for the 
interaction term between self-censorship on SNS and residence in former East Germany 
is positive and significant in the model predicting one-way political talk. The coefficient 
is also positive and close to the conventional threshold for statistical significance (p= 
.057) in the model predicting two-way political talk. Thus, all else being equal, the 
association between self-censorship on social media and political posting on MIMS is 
stronger for Germans residing in former East than West Germany. The coefficients for 
the interaction terms involving British and Italian respondents are quite similar to each 
other, and far from statistical significance. Thus, there are no discernible differences 
between how political self-censorship on SNS is associated with political talk on MIMS 
among British, Italian, and West German respondents. This increases our confidence 
that the patterns we have identified can be explained specifically by differences between 
East and West Germans’ political culture. 
The fact that the coefficient for the variable clustering East German residents is 
negative and significant suggests that East Germans who do not censor themselves 
politically on social media are substantially less likely to post political messages on 
MIMS than their West German counterparts. In other words, MIMS are not more popular 
among East German than West German respondents per se—they are actually less 
popular among East German respondents who do not censor themselves politically on 
SNS. However, East Germans who are concerned about expressing some of their political 
thoughts on SNS are noticeably more likely than West Germans of similar inclinations to 
rely on MIMS to post political messages. A hypothetical average West German resident 
who censors some of her political posts on social media has a 33% predicted probability 
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of posting political messages on MIMS. If we construct this average respondent as an 
East German resident, the probability soars to 56%.  
Some limitations of this study need to be acknowledged. First, our hypotheses are 
tested by employing cross-sectional data that do not allow us to empirically ascertain 
the causal direction of the relationships we investigated, and some endogeneity cannot 
thus be ruled out. Longitudinal survey data and experimental research would be better 
suited to study these causal mechanisms. Secondly, our sample is based on a panel 
administered online, albeit constructed to mirror the distribution of the main socio-
demographic characteristics of the population with Internet access. Respondents 
recruited via online panels may be more active on the internet and on MIMS than the 
average internet user, and our data may therefore over-estimate the percentage of SNS 
and MIMS users and their levels of political talk. However, we are confident, based on 
several recent studies (e.g. Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2006; Pasek, 2016; 
Bytzek & Bieber, 2016) that our samples produced correct estimates of the relationships 
between our variables of interest, even if they may have not yielded accurate estimates 
of their univariate distributions. Reliance on self-reports is also less than ideal due to the 
pervasiveness of MIMS in their users’ everyday lives, which may bias recall of 
communication exchanges that are often short, fragmentary, and compete for attention 
with other simultaneous digital and physical stimuli. Finally, our measures refer to 
MIMS use in general, but citizens’ uses of, and gratifications from, digital platforms 
derive from their specific affordances and may thus vary substantially between different 
mobile services. Future research may benefit from a more granular approach focused on 
the political uses of specific MIMS, ideally by combining quantitative and qualitative data 
and supplementing self-reports with unobtrusive observations of users’ interactions. 
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Conclusions 
 
Mobile Instant Messaging Services are becoming relevant environments for political 
talk. By facilitating intimate and controlled conversations within small groups while on 
the go, MIMS have acquired a relevant position in the repertoires of political talk of 
many—though not most—of their users. This is especially true for users who are so 
politically self-conscious to censor some of their political thoughts when posting on 
social media, and for users who hold ideologically extreme positions. Such individual 
dispositions are compounded by systemic factors, such as historically rooted political 
cultures favoring privacy over openness in political talk. 
These findings have ambivalent implications for the quality of political debate in 
contemporary media ecosystems. On the one hand, MIMS enable people who do not feel 
confident in broadcasting some of their political views to their whole, undifferentiated 
online networks to more comfortably express and discuss their positions in more closely 
controlled settings. This may encourage more—and more diverse—citizens to engage in 
political talk on MIMS, and such talk may in turn enhance MIMS users’ political 
knowledge and engagement. On the other hand, by discussing politics in private and 
selective settings, MIMS users could entrap themselves in small political bubbles of 
likeminded strong ties, possibly holding more extreme political views than the rest of 
their networks. If these patterns result in a reduction of the ratio of political talk 
involving weak ties in favor of strong ties, they can have negative implications for 
informal deliberation (Campbell & Kwak, 2010) and participation (Gil de Zúñiga and 
Valenzuela (2011).  
The rise of MIMS as platforms for digital political talk challenges scholars to 
reconsider the theories and models with which we understand the social and political 
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implications of information and communication technologies. MIMS seem to be 
augmenting but also complicating the development of networked individualism, as 
subjects use these platforms to craft smaller and more private social clusters alongside 
with—or, conceivably, in substitution of—the relatively more inclusive and open 
networks characterizing the most popular social networking sites as they have evolved 
so far. Creative theoretical reasoning and fresh empirical research are needed to 
understand the implications of these changes for the nature of personal communication 
ecosystems—including the extent to which they enable different forms of political talk.  
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